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Abstract
The perception of the importance of animal health and its relationship with biosecurity has increased in recent
years with the emergence and re-emergence of several diseases difficult to control. This is particularly evident in
the case of pig farming as shown by the recent episodes of African swine fever or porcine epidemic diarrhoea.
Moreover, a better biosecurity may help to improve productivity and may contribute to reducing the use of
antibiotics. Biosecurity can be defined as the application of measures aimed to reduce the probability of the
introduction (external biosecurity) and further spread of pathogens within the farm (internal biosecurity). Thus, the
key idea is to avoid transmission, either between farms or within the farm. This implies knowledge of the
epidemiology of the diseases to be avoided that is not always available, but since ways of transmission of
pathogens are limited to a few, it is possible to implement effective actions even with some gaps in our
knowledge on a given disease. For the effective design of a biosecurity program, veterinarians must know how
diseases are transmitted, the risks and their importance, which mitigation measures are thought to be more
effective and how to evaluate the biosecurity and its improvements. This review provides a source of information
on external and internal biosecurity measures that reduce risks in swine production and the relationship between
these measures and the epidemiology of the main diseases, as well as a description of some systems available for
risk analysis and the assessment of biosecurity. Also, it reviews the factors affecting the successful application of a
biosecurity plan in a pig farm.
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Introduction
The prevention of infectious diseases in pigs is import-
ant for both animal welfare and economic productivity.
Moreover, prevention is also important for food safety
and public health when zoonotic pathogens are con-
cerned. Biosecurity embraces all aspects of the preven-
tion of pathogens entering and spreading within a group
of animals. In recent years, with the emergence and re-
emergence of difficult-to-control diseases such as African
swine fever or porcine epidemic diarrhoea, the perception
of the critical importance of pig health and its relationship
with biosecurity has increased in recent years. In other
cases, for example, influenza A virus, animal pathogens
have the potential for producing a pandemic event. The
implementation of biosecurity measures all along the pro-
duction chain minimises the risk of introduction of new
pathogens into the farms, as well as their spread within
farms. Nevertheless, the implementation of sustainable
biosecurity programs and its continuous improvement is
still a challenge for many pig farms.
The origin of the biosecurity concept in swine production
From the decade of 1960, swine production shifted pro-
gressively from a system made of small family-owned
farms towards a large-scale industry. This evolution
made evident that the management of health and disease
should be oriented in a new way [1]. In the 1980 decade,
concepts such as “minimal disease” or “specific-pathogen
free farms” began to be common and led to the modern
concept of biosecurity [2, 3].
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Early publications defined biosecurity as ¨the security
form of transmission of infectious diseases, parasites and
pests¨ [4]. However, at that time most of the available
information was mainly based in a combination of
knowledge on the epidemiology of some diseases, com-
mon sense and experience [4–6]. It became increasingly
evident that a more methodical approach was needed.
Soon thereafter scientific journals started to publish pa-
pers on biosecurity in swine farms [7–9].
The modern concept of biosecurity
Since the early, almost intuitive, definitions of biosecur-
ity, this concept has evolved at the same pace than swine
production. Nowadays, in developed countries, pig pro-
duction shows a trend towards concentration: bigger
farms in lesser hands together with an increasing need
of animal movements. Within this frame, the introduc-
tion of a new pathogen in a farm can have serious or
even catastrophic consequences, not only for the affected
farms, but also for all other connected operations. A re-
cent example of this was the introduction and spread of
porcine epidemic diarrhea virus in the Americas or of
African swine fever virus in Europe and Asia [10–12].
As a result, the concept and perception of the diseases
have changed from the individual to the farm and, from
the farm to the region. Keeping diseases away is now
one of the key elements in animal production [13].
Academically, biosecurity can be defined as the appli-
cation of measures aimed to reduce the probability of
introduction and spread of pathogens [5, 14]. When the
measures are aimed at the reduction of the probability
of introduction, the term external biosecurity is used.
When the measures aim to reduce the spread of patho-
gens once they are already present in the farm, the term
internal biosecurity is used.
The key concept in biosecurity is to avoid transmis-
sion, either between farms or within the farm. Therefore,
the applicable measures must result in a reduction of
the probability of effective transmission. This implies a
knowledge of the epidemiology of the diseases to be
avoided, particularly of the routes of transmission, the
stability of the agent in the environment and the role of
fomites and vectors [15].
For many important diseases, knowledge of epidemi-
ology is much less than complete. This is an important
gap that needs to be filled. However, since the ways in
which a pathogen can be transmitted are limited to a
few, for most diseases it is possible to foresee a set of po-
tentially efficacious measures. A completely different
point is to establish a prioritisation of the measures
based on its potential efficacy. This requires a quantita-
tive knowledge on the contribution of each route or
element in the transmission of the infection. Beyond
that, the actual implementation of the selected
biosecurity measures involves economic, sociological
and even psychological aspects.
Main biosecurity measures
In this section we will review the most commonly ap-
plied biosecurity measures.
Common external biosecurity measures
The concept of external biosecurity can be intuitively
understood as the blocking of the farm from the “dan-
gers coming from the outside world”. This implies that
many of the measures aimed at the external biosecurity
are physical barriers or rules banning the introduction of
certain animals, people or vehicles.
Introduction of replacements, quarantines and use of
semen
The highest probability of introduction of a new patho-
gen is the introduction of animals [5, 16–18]. Due to the
nature of the current production systems, to keep prod-
uctivity within the desired standards, replacement of
breeders is needed. In most cases, this can imply a re-
newal of the whole breeding population every 2–2.5
years. Those replacements can be produced internally;
namely some of the female offspring is selected as the
replacement for the existing sows or, they may be pur-
chased from an external source. Internal replacements
may be convenient for some farms that operate as a
closed system and rely on males (semen) for genetic im-
provement. Eradication of diseases endemic in the farm
is often difficult when internal replacements are used. A
similar reasoning applies to the use of semen produced
in-farm.
In other production systems, external replacements
are preferred in order to fully control all management
and health aspects of the replacement gilts. In this later
case, the implications of this fact are double: firstly, the
higher the frequency of new entries, the higher the prob-
ability of entering a pathogen and; secondly, the higher
the replacement rate, the more difficult to maintain herd
immunity against the endemic farm pathogens. To this,
it must be added the need for insemination doses that, if
purchased from an external source, can be a risk for the
introduction of new pathogens as well.
Assuming that many farms must rely on external re-
placement sources, the way in which those new animals
are to be managed will become the key to success. At
present, the most efficient way of organizing production
is in mating/farrowing batches (usually every week or
every 3 weeks). Ideally, this organization requires entry
of replacements with the same periodicity of the farrow-
ing batches (weekly or every 3 weeks). In these systems,
one first biosecurity barrier would be to set a list of
health requirements for the sources of gilts. This list
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must classify diseases based on the risk they pose to the
farm and must indicate which verification tests are to be
performed (as a routine). While for some pathogens the
mere suspicion of its presence in the source farm would
be enough to discard that source as a supplier (e.g., the
presence of PRRSV seropositive gilts in a source aimed
to supply a PRRS-negative herd), for other pathogens,
their presence would be admissible under certain condi-
tions (e.g., porcine parvovirus is acceptable since vaccin-
ation is highly effective). In any case, a well-designed
and well-managed quarantine is the most effective meas-
ure to reduce risk associated to the introduction of ex-
ternal pathogens.
Quarantines must be designed as biocontention units;
namely, they must be designed to avoid the spillover of
any undesired pathogen brought by the incoming ani-
mals. Therefore, direct connection between the quaran-
tine unit and the main farm must be blocked. Usually,
this means locating the quarantine far from the main
units of the farm and treating quarantines as if they still
were the “outside world”; that is, managing them as in-
dependent facilities. Additionally, the quarantine has to
be managed in a strict all-in/all-out system to avoid po-
tential transmission of pathogens between different gilt
batches. Risk associated to the entry of gilts can be re-
duced by decreasing the frequency of entry of the new
batches. However, this implies changes in the whole
organization of the farm and in the managing of breed-
ing batches, with the consequent problems for allocating
the animals in the available spaces. The bigger the batch,
the larger the space needed for each batch.
Regarding the localisation of quarantines, most often it
is said that they must be located no less than 1000m
from any other pig unit. This is considered a safe dis-
tance for airborne transmission of most pathogens (but
not all), and for transmission by rodents, flies, etc. [19,
20]. However, some viral pathogens such Aujeszky’s dis-
ease virus, foot and mouth disease virus or porcine re-
productive respiratory virus 2 (PRRSV2) or bacteria such
as Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae have been reported to
be transmitted -or could be potentially transmitted- by
air to longer distances (up to 20 Km for foot and mouth
disease virus, 9 Km for Aujeszky’s disease virus, PRRSV2
or M. hyopneumoniae) [21–23]. Air filtration is proven
to prevent pathogen introduction in high density areas
The use of HEPA air filters in the windows or ventila-
tion inlets reduces the entrance of pathogens [24–27].
HEPA filters are the gold standard of microbiological air
filtration but less expensive filters may also have a good
efficiency. Under laboratory conditions, a combination
of fine filters (EU class M and F) resulted in > 98% of ef-
ficiency to filter equine arteritvis virus and > 99.9% for
bacteria such as Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae [28].
Similarly, Dee et al. (2010) showed that MERV 14 (EU
8) filters, or multi-layered polypropylene filters treated
with microbiocidal compounds were fully efficient to
block PRRSV or Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae [27].
Other low-cost filtration methods were less efficient al-
though provided some level of protection [25]. In an
economic evaluation analysis of air filtration systems to
prevent PRRSV, Alonso et al. (2013) [29] calculated a
payback time between 2 and 7 years depending of the re-
duction of the frequency of outbreaks and on the pre-
mium received for being free of PRRSV. Provided that
the quarantine is far enough from other sections of the
farm, the main connection between the quarantine and
the main farm will be the personnel. Transmission of
pathogens from personnel to pigs is mainly related to
the role of humans as fomites (clothes, boots, hair, etc.)
(with the exception of some diseases such as influenza).
Accordingly, barrier methods are highly effective: use of
clothes, boots, gloves, etc. of exclusive use of the quaran-
tine plus the obligation of taking a shower before leaving
the quarantine are generally considered enough (section
3.1.2. below revise the general requirements for entering
the farm). Use of exclusive clothes, shoes and tools to-
gether with handwashing are the minimum compulsory
measures. In transmission experiments for foot-and-
mouth disease those measures were able to stop trans-
mission by caretakers of pigs but not when the used spe-
cies was sheep in which case the addition of a shower
was a necessary measure [30, 31] Beyond this, the poten-
tial airborne spread of pathogens from the quarantine
can be minimized using a system of locked doors and
windows in the pens with an adequate play of air flow
and air pressures.
How long the quarantine must be prolonged? The
duration of the quarantine depends on three elements:
a) The incubation period of the diseases included in our
“avoid” list, b) the duration of the contagious period for
such diseases and, c) the time needed to establish a diag-
nosis [5, 32]. Accordingly, the duration will be deter-
mined by the diseases included in our list and the
availability of diagnostic facilities. Moreover, animals
must be inspected, preferably daily, for any sign of dis-
ease [30]. Also, it is necessary to have a contingency plan
for the event of a positive result for an unwanted disease.
This contingency plan may range from extending isola-
tion of the replacement batch until the gilts are no lon-
ger a threat, to discarding just positive individuals and
extending quarantine of the others with continuous
monitoring, to complete depopulation of the quarantine
and monitoring of the destination farm.
At this point of the review it is worth to note that
quarantine and acclimation are somewhat opposed con-
cepts. While quarantine is aimed to avoid the entry of
pathogens brought by incoming animals and, therefore,
minimizing contact between existing and new animals is
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critical; acclimation is aimed, among other goals, to de-
velop immunity against the pathogens existing in the farm
[33, 34] and, this often requires to have a close contact be-
tween newcomers and the present stock of breeders. Thus,
a clear-cut separation must be made between the quaran-
tine and acclimation phases. In Brazil, Serafini Poeta Silva
et al., (2019) [35], associate the adaptation of the replace-
ment to a lower seroprevalence and better control of
Swine Influenza in breeding herds. Use of externally pur-
chased semen is, in practical terms, equivalent to the
introduction of a boar. Again, suppliers should be certified
to be free of the diseases in our “unwanted” list and must
be auditable with regards to their health status [18]. The
number of providers should be as limited as possible
(ideally, only one) to reduce the risk [36–38].
People and vehicles
People and vehicles can be important pathways for the
introduction of new diseases in the farm [39–42]. By its
own way of operation, farms receive lots of visits and ve-
hicles: workers of the farm, veterinarians, repair workers,
transports of feedstuff, dead-animals, etc. Beyond that,
transport of animals is a category of its own.
Fomites carried by people (boots, clothes, etc.) or even
the people itself, through contaminated skin, can spread
various pig pathogens such as Salmonella, PRRSV, PED,
TGEV, Brachyspira or Lawsonia [43–49]. People can
also act as introducers of diseases common to people
and animals. This is the case of influenza. In fact, clas-
sical H1N1 viruses or the original introduction of H3N2
originated from humans, just like the 2009 H1N1 pan-
demic virus (reviewed by Rajao et al.) [50].
The risk associated to visits may be minimized by a
combination of barrier measures and regulations
restricting the entrance to the farm. Who (people or ve-
hicles) must be allowed to enter the farm? The generic
answer to the question is simple, only those that are es-
sential; the practical application of this principle is much
more complicated. A list on who can or who cannot
enter should be elaborated stating the rules for entering.
In the next lines the main actions to minimize these
risks will be reviewed.
The essential measure to restrict visitors and vehicles
in the farm is to establish a clear delimitation of clean
and dirty areas [51]. Clean areas area those inside the
farm perimeter, in contact with pigs. The clean areas in-
clude barns, offices and connecting hallways and all the
areas and equipment in contact with pigs Dirty areas are
those that may contain sources of infection for the pigs
present in the farm and, in practical terms, everything
outside of the clean areas can be considered a dirty area.
Entrance doors, walls, a changing room, a shower or a
line painted in the floor maybe the interface between
clean and dirty areas. Nothing should be allowed to
cross the dirty area towards the clean area without being
decontaminated. Clean and dirty roads may also exist.
The dirty road must be used for any transport that
serves multiple companies or farms. Work routines must
be organized.
A perimeter fence with a permanently closed door that
can only be opened from inside the farm is the main div-
ision between “inside” and “outside” the farm. A side use
of this fence is to restrict access of wild animals such as
wild boars, which are a serious risk for some diseases
such as Classical or African swine fever [52–54]. To
note, materials of the fence have to be chosen for that
purpose, as wild boars can easily destroy regular wire
fences. Beyond that, barriers preventing excavation
under the fence must be built.
A parking area outside the farm must be implemented
[55] for all those operations that do not require entrance
to the farm with the vehicle (for example, the veterinar-
ian visiting the farm).
Some operations require some level of contact with
the farm. This is the case of vehicles delivering feedstuff,
collecting dead animals or slurry. The most adequate ap-
proach for those operations is a proper design of the
farm. The activities requiring such contact need to be lo-
cated, as far as possible, in the external perimeter with
no need to enter the farm. For feedstuff, the most ad-
equate way is to locate the silos for feed close to the per-
imeter fence, allowing the loading from the truck
without the need of entering the farm. Containers for
dead animals and slurry tanks must be located immedi-
ately outside the perimeter fence to avoid the collecting
truck entering the farm. Both vehicles circle in “dirty
road”. In farms where the design does not allow that, a
clear delimitation of the road and of the clean and dirty
areas is essential. Under any circumstance the trucks,
the drivers or other assistant personnel should be
allowed to enter in contact with the animals [40, 41].
Kim et al. [48] showed the importance of this measure.
They examined the transmission of porcine epidemic
diarrhoea virus under low and high biosecurity measures
and observed that clothes and boots of personnel ex-
posed to infected animals easily got contaminated with
amounts of virus likely causing transmission, particularly
for boots and coveralls. Small amounts of contaminated
faeces in the boots of a driver could be enough to infect
a farm.
Once a vehicle/visitor is allowed to enter in to the
farm perimeter, a set of rules to minimize risk must be
applied. Entry of people must be compulsorily done
through a reception building. They must register in a
registry book indicating name, company and/or reason
for visiting and indicating the latest day that they visited
a pig farm. In many farms, safety procedures usually in-
dicate a 24-48 h period to consider that a previous visit
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to a farm is not a risk. However, this is not based in a
real evaluation of the lability of different swine patho-
gens since survival of different virus, bacteria or parasites
may be very different and has not been thoroughly stud-
ied. An additional factor to be considered when estab-
lishing this period is the health status of the farm, the
barriers established at entering the premises (showering,
handwashing, changing clothes, etc.). In a farm with a
good standard requiring at least handwashing and chan-
ging outwear and boots, the main risks would be associ-
ated to contamination of hair or to presence of
pathogens in the oronasal mucosa. Kim et al. (2017)
found Porcine epidemic diarrhoea virus RNA in the hair
of personnel in contact with infected animals 1 day after
contact but the positive personnel was not able to trans-
mit the infection. Oma et al. (2018) [56] in a model of
exposure to bovine viruses (bovine coronavirus and bo-
vine respiratory coronavirus) viral RNA was not found
in the oronasal mucosa of exposed people 6 h after the
exposure although most of them were positive at 1 h.
Taking the previous data in consideration, 24 h could be
a reasonable time for a farm with a good health standard
and applying basic biosecurity measures. Certainly, the
higher the health standard and the potential of impact of
a new disease, the longer that restriction period (up to
48 h). Introduction in the farm of laptops, cell phones
and other electronics may be a risk if they are not
decontaminated. Browne C., et al., (2016) [57] observed
the viability of Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae on various
surfaces for up to 8 days at 4 °C.
The next step would be to establish the rules for en-
tering into the facilities allocating the animals. The mini-
mum acceptable regulation would be to change clothes
and boots for ones of exclusive use of the farm, washing
hands and not sharing materials between farms. In those
cases, that materials must be shared, it can be useful to
expose them to UV irradiation [58] or to immerse them
in disinfectant solution [3]. These can range from di-
luted bleach to commercial disinfectants. To note that
most disinfectants have lower or poor activity in the
presence of high concentrations of organic material.
Wearing gloves, and eventually a cap, is advisable. A
higher level of biosecurity would include a compulsory
shower. As commented above, taking a shower and fully
changing outwear is able to fully reduce transmission of
FMDV between pigs or sheep by contaminated
personnel [30, 31] although for many pathogens hand-
wash and outwear change probably are effective.
In this case, again, clean and dirty areas have to be
delimited. A very simple rule would be to consider any
area where it is allowed to wear clothes or shoes form
the “outside” as dirty. A simple separation can be a
bench that delimitates the clean and dirty area of the
changing room. Relevance of these measures are
supported by transmission studies on Influenza, PRRS or
FMD, where these viruses were transmitted through
contaminated boots, gloves, contaminated skin or over-
alls that had been in contact with infected pigs [45, 59,
60]. Pork products consumption in the farm, either by
visitors or personnel, should also be avoided as some im-
portant pathogens such as ASF can survive in them [61].
Transport of animals
Vehicles used to transport animals between farms or to
the slaughterhouse and drivers from these vehicles can
have an important role in the transmission of pathogens
between farms, as it has been described elsewhere [40,
41, 62]. Several measures can be applied to reduce such
risks.
The first one would be to define the uses allowed for a
specific truck. A “safe” animal transport truck should
not be used for a risky transport. For example, a truck
destined for the transport of replacements must not be
used for transport of animals to the slaughterhouse.
Similarly, a truck should not pick up animals on differ-
ent farms as this increases the risk of spread of patho-
gens. Therefore, establishing a list of “allowed transports
and permissible actions” for each truck, along with the
design of its routes, would be the first measure. Sec-
ondly, truck cleaning and disinfection must be done in a
planned and conscientious manner. Cleaning and disin-
fecting trucks is a very difficult task to carry out in prac-
tice [63]. As a matter of fact, it has been shown that a
high percentage of slaughterhouse trucks were positive
for Salmonella after cleaning and disinfection proce-
dures [63]. There is a general agreement that for this
cleaning and disinfection to be effective, the process
must include the removal of organic matter, cleaning
with water, preferably hot and soapy or with descaling,
drying and subsequent disinfection with appropriate
substances [57, 58]. The main problems arise from the
difficulty of removing organic residues from corners and
recesses in the truck bed and from drying the trucks. In
winter, particularly in cold climates, natural drying of a
truck can take days. For this, alternatives such as air dry-
ing or heated boxes have been designed [64, 65]. Actu-
ally, Dee et al. (2004) [64] found that when trucks were
washed, disinfected and dried, PRRS virus could not be
found by RT-PCR nor transmission happened to sentinel
pigs. All other methods allowed the presence of the
virus.
Loading and unloading animals is one of the most crit-
ical situations regarding the contact of animals present
in the farm with vehicles or persons from outside the
farm. The best approach to minimize risks is to build a
loading/unloading dock. This structure must have a dirty
area (outside the farm) where trucks may park. This
dirty area leads to a managing corridor (narrow enough
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to allow animals passing one by one) that has a gate.
That gate should be low enough to permit only the
crossing of an animal but not of a person standing. Usu-
ally, this is achieved by means of a sliding door or a
similar mechanism. From the gate inwards should be
considered “clean” area.
Neighbourhood
This term is related to the spatial clustering of cases,
whereas the specific path by which transmission occurs
among neighbours is not always clear [66]. For example,
Torremorell et al. [67] attributed 80% of new PRRSV in-
fections on negative commercial farms to spread from
neighbours, but the exact path of transmission was not
identified. The probability of infection due to the farm lo-
cation will be variable and influenced by what is present
in the neighbourhood [67]. The number and type of pig
farms (e.g., presence of fattening farms versus breeding
farms), presence of slaughterhouses, garbage dumps or
dead-animals rendering plants in a radius of 1 km to the
farm could increase such probability [5, 68, 69].
One possible path of pathogen transmission among
neighbours is airborne spread. As mentioned before, dis-
tance by which pathogens can be transmitted through
air is variable and will also be dependent on weather
conditions (i.e., optimal in winter with high humidity
and constant moderate winds) and on landscape (i.e.,
optimal in flat land).
Probably, FMDV and PRRSV have been the best stud-
ied pig pathogens with regards to airborne transmission.
For FMDV it was shown that long-distance (up to 10
Km) airborne transmission was more likely to occur with
high humidity (> 60%), low speed wind with stable direc-
tion, cloud cover, temperature below 27C (better at
lower temperatures) and no precipitation [70–74]. For
PRRSV, one of the main factors for the viability of the
virus in the aerosols was temperature with a very short
half-live (less than 30min) at 20C. In the case of PRRSV,
low humidity seems to favour survival in aerosols under
laboratory conditions [27, 75, 76]. A 2-year study
showed that cool temperatures, low sunlight levels,
winds of low velocity in conjunction with gusts and ris-
ing humidity and pressure were the conditions more
likely to favour PRRSV airborne transmission [27] More-
over, in the case of PRRSV2, the aerosol transmission of
different strains may differ. For PRRSV1 airborne trans-
mission seems less likely, maybe because of the lower
levels of viremia [77].
The measures to prevent this transmission are basic-
ally barrier measures. The simplest is to raise a hedge or
plant a grove that acts as a barrier in the most frequent
direction of the wind in the area but more sophisticated
systems, such as the installation of HEPA or other type
of filters, can be used as mentioned before.
Other paths of pathogen transmission linked to the
neighbourhood include rodents, mechanical vectors such
as flies, and others animals (either stray or belonging to
neighbouring farms) or birds. Rodents can be carriers of
numerous pathogens that affect pigs, such as some Sal-
monella serovars, Leptospira, Yersinia pseudotuberculo-
sis, Toxoplasma gondii, Campylobacter spp., Brachyspira
spp, Lawsonia intracellularis or the encephalomyocardi-
tis virus [78–83]. Generally, mice have a radius of action
of 25 to 150 m and therefore, their role in transmission
between farms is limited. However, individual rats can
move 3 km away in one night [79, 84]. Flies can act as
mechanical vectors, although their flight radius (2-3 km)
and the narrow range of temperatures at which they sur-
vive [85] limit their role as mechanical spreaders of
pathogens at large distances. Nevertheless, some studies
showed the presence of infectious PRRS virus in a pro-
portion of houseflies captured at 1.7 Km from the source
farm [86]. Anyway, transmission has not been proven
farther than hundreds of metres [62]. Evidences exist for
the role of flies in the transmission of other pathogens
such as Streptococcus suis or Brachyspira spp. [21, 87, 88].
Dogs and cats may also be the source of some patho-
gens for pigs [89–92] although these animals should not
be present in a pig farm. A perimeter fence may prevent
stray or neighbouring animals from entering into the
farm premises.
Some species of birds have been associated with dis-
ease outbreaks. For example, in one study it was esti-
mated that around 30% of new TGE outbreaks were
caused by starlings [93]. Birds have also been involved in
the spread of some pathogens such as Salmonella, Law-
sonia intracellularis, Brachyspira hyopdiseneteriae and E.
coli [83, 94–96] and may act as a reservoir perpetuating
circulation on the farm. The main biosecurity measure
would be the placement of bird proof nets on windows
and keeping the doors closed to avoid the entry and
nesting of birds. All buildings must be bird proofed. Any
damage to bird netting or the facility exterior which al-
lows pest entry must be repaired immediately. Further-
more, silos and feed tanks should be kept closed to
prevent access by birds and contamination by faeces.
This may be important in the case of Salmonella [70].
Feed and water
Feedstuff itself does not generally pose a risk due to the
hygienic conditions in the production, particularly if the
feed is heat-treated. For example, pelleting eliminates
PEDV from contaminated feedstuff [97]. Nevertheless,
different pathogens can contaminate and survive on feed
ingredients and could therefore be introduced in a farm
[98–103]. For example, Dee et al. (2016) detected the
PEDV, ASFV, SVA, CSFV, PRV, and FMD in soybean
meal (conventional and organic), vitamin D supplements,
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lysine and choline [99]. Actually, pigs fed with PEDV-
spiked feedstuff were successfully infected, proving that
this can be a potential source of spread for this virus
[103]. Gordon et al. (2019) [104] reviewed the role of non-
animal ingredients as a source of viral pathogens for
swine.
This risk can be maintained below critical status by
minimizing the likelihood that a pathogen can enter the
feed supply chain, such as by excluding high-risk ingre-
dients from facilities, extending biosecurity to mills, and
considering proactive mitigation strategies [105–107].
Some of these are, develop storage facilities for incoming
products ‘feed quarantine’, and determining and setting
a schedule for a validated sampling method [108] of in-
gredients that are considered higher risk (origin animal
or not animal). Limit and establish a flow of movement
of people (employees in the feed mill and visitors, such
as guests, truck drivers, and subcontractors people) or
vehicles in or out of a facility because also has the poten-
tial to introduce contaminants into a feed manufacturing
facility [109]. Several studies have shown that chemical
additives for the feedstuff can be reliable methods for
mitigating such risk for both viruses and bacteria [110–
113]. Effective additives are organic acids such as formic,
lactic or propionic, but also fatty acids and essential oils
have been proven to have efficacy against certain patho-
gens [114]. Formaldehyde has been shown to be effective
at preventing risk associated with PEDV [110, 115] as
well as Salmonella [106, 107]. Furthermore, the use of
formaldehyde in feed may lead to detrimental bacterial
shifts in the pig gut [116]. Another strategy that has
been proven to be effective in mitigating this risk is
flushing feed manufacturing equipment with rice hulls
treated with chemical compounds with antimicrobial
properties such as formaldehyde or a hexanoic:octanoic:
decanoic mix [117]. Therefore, feed should be provided
by a reputable supplier with a recognized quality assur-
ance system and food ingredients should not be trans-
ported in a vehicle that is used to transport pigs or other
livestock [98].
Drinking water used on farms could also be a source
of pathogens introduction [8]. A disease that has classic-
ally been related to water contamination is leptospirosis.
Leptospira from rats and other animals can contaminate
water, or even rats can be ingested by pigs. Furthermore,
most pathogens that follow a cycle of faecal-oral trans-
mission have the potential to be carried through the
water. Silva et al., (2018) [118], develop the biosecurity
vulnerability scores for PRRS the results suggest that
events related transmission by air and water, and
people/animals movements should be prioritized. There-
fore, the bacteriological quality of the water should be
checked regularly, at least once a year [119]. Water sys-
tems, tanks and pipes should be cleaned and disinfected
regularly as biofilm can be a source of bacteria for pigs
[32]. Also the source water treatment is an important
tool in risk management. Common water treatment
techniques used include physically removing chemical
and biotic contaminants through filtration (reverse os-
mosis system and /or inactivating pathogens by applying
ultraviolet light [120] or chemincal oxidant disinfectants
such as chlorine, [121] cloramines and ozone.
Common internal biosecurity measures
As previously mentioned, internal biosecurity aims to re-
duce the probability of the spread of pathogens once the
farm has been infected. These measures can be grouped
into: a) measures related to management of the herd, b)
general hygiene of facilities, c) cleaning and disinfection
and, d) personnel.
Measures related to management
The main objective of this group of measures is to con-
trol the flow of animals to avoid mixing pigs from differ-
ent age groups. Usually, it is considered essential to
avoid movements against the production flow. This is
achieved with the strict application of an all-in / all-out
system complemented by cleaning and disinfecting the
facilities for the new batches of animals. This measure
has been reported to be effective to reduce the circula-
tion of pathogens [122] and to reduce the amount and
variety of drug application on farms. These last authors
observed that in Japanese farms where the all-in / all-out
system was applied in all production stages, there was a
lower use of antimicrobials for the treatment of pneu-
monia and oedema disease. In France, a reduction in the
prevalence of Salmonella in pigs sent to the slaughter-
house was also observed when this measure was carried
out [123].
However, this flow control is not enough for all dis-
eases. For example, for those diseases in which transmis-
sion can occur in maternities, cross fostering, even
between sows of the same batch, can contribute to the
spread of the disease. This has been shown for PRRS
virus, in fact, limiting adoptions is one of the measures
that is usually implemented during a PRRS outbreak in
maternity areas [124].
Another important fact to consider when applying
management measures is that sows are the reservoir for
many of the pathogens present on the farm. From the
late 1970s, early weaning systems began to be studied
based on the idea that certain pathogens were transmit-
ted from mother to offspring at certain times. Separating
piglets from the mother earlier would prevent this trans-
mission and, consequently, would reduce or even elimin-
ate the presence of certain diseases [125–127]. These
techniques, while partially effective, are detrimental to
pig well-being and in Europe, contravene community
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welfare standards. It is also important to establish a work
routine that takes into account the role in disease trans-
mission of the different age groups within the farm. The
usual recommendation is to establish a workflow follow-
ing the pig flow, from younger to older. Thus, personnel
working in the fattening units should not enter into the
nurseries after contacting fatteners or go back to a ma-
ternity from a nursery.
Measures related to facilities and cleaning and disinfection
The facilities should contribute to reduce the transmis-
sion of diseases or, at least, must not facilitate their
spread. A very basic aspect to start with would be its de-
sign. In poorly designed or poorly planned farms it is
relatively common for animals to have to move between
different sections for loading, unloading or between pro-
duction phases so that animals of different ages can have
contact. Likewise, it is important that the facilities allow
a correct organization of work and, to a certain extent,
contribute to respect a separation between the different
ages present on the farm. This can be achieved with
physical barriers such as doors, foot baths, or intermedi-
ate areas for hand washing and changing boots.
However, all these barrier measures tend to hinder
work routines. Sometimes the different areas can be
painted with different colours and clothes and boots of
the corresponding colour can be used to make more dif-
ficult to violate the rule of non-contact between different
stages of production.
The nature of the materials used in the facilities is an
important factor. The separations between pens or
rooms and the floor are usually cited as the most im-
portant elements. For example, discontinuous separa-
tions between pens are known to facilitate the
transmission of respiratory pathogens while solid separa-
tions facilitate the transmission of enteric pathogens
[128]. On the other hand, something similar happens
with floors, particularly in maternity areas. While metal
and plastic floors are cleaner, they have a negative im-
pact on comfort. Straw beds are very comfortable, but
increase the risk of presentation of diarrhoea outbreaks
[122]. The ventilation system should also be added to
this section, since inadequate ventilation contributes to
an increase in the environmental microbial load, particu-
larly for respiratory pathogens.
Regarding hygienic measures, the most basic element
is the cleaning and disinfection of the pens. Similar to
what happens with trucks, pens should be cleaned first
by removing organic debris, then they should be washed
with soapy water, and after rinsing and drying they
should be disinfected. Dione et al. [129] evaluated 276
farms in Uganda, and found a reduction in seropositivity
to Streptococcus suis by the use of disinfectants on farms.
This pathogen is rapidly eliminated by phenyl com-
pounds, chlorine, and iodine.
The second fundamental hygienic measure refers to
the administration of vaccines and drugs. Needles should
be exchanged between individuals, although this is very
difficult to achieve in practice. Often workers see the
change of needle as a waste of time. To teach them the
importance of this practice is essential. The minimum
acceptable would be to use individual needles in sows
and, at least, to change needles for each litter or pen.
Measures related to personnel
Personnel working in the farm are key elements to keep
internal biosecurity. Their role is double, in one hand,
they have to implement the rules and, on the other
hand, they may act themselves as means for the spread
of pathogens within the farm.
Personnel must know well which are the assigned
areas of work and what the work routines are. For ex-
ample, a worker in the fattening area should not go to a
maternity hospital. Often, a colour code for walls and
clothes may help to this end. This implies to have spe-
cific clothing and footwear of the corresponding colour.
Obviously, this requires additional planning for cleaning
and replacement and areas for changing must be
designed.
Finally, measures such as the use of gloves, periodic
hand washing and foot baths will lessen the impact of
the worker acting as a fomite within the farm. It is
known that the maintenance of foot baths requires con-
tinuous attention to avoid the excessive accumulation of
organic matter. The contact time with the disinfectant
required to sanitize the boot varies with the product but
usually is measured in minutes. Moreover, the presence
of organic materials may affect the practical efficacy or
the time needed to act. In farms where is not likely that
footbaths and foot bath procedures are to be followed,
having specific clean boots for each area can be a good
alternative.
Simply walking on a foot bath and not removing the
faecal matter from the boots before entering the disin-
fectant solution does not reduce the number of patho-
gens in them [6, 130]. It is therefore recommended to
first clean the boots in a preliminary foot wash, using a
brush and soapy water and then, followed by the
immersion of the clean boot in the disinfectant solution
for at least 5 min and covering no less than 15 cm of the
boot sole. This is effective for disinfection and does not
waste disinfecting solution in the foot baths. Disinfecting
solution must be changed preferably daily and every 3
days would be the least acceptable routine [6]. If foot
baths are not an option in the farm, a less effective, but
still recommended measure, could be the use of different
boots for the outside and inside of the different farm
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buildings, with the establishment of a periodic cleaning
and disinfection system for them.
Vaccines are an essential part of the internal biosecur-
ity of animal populations. Recent advances in molecular
biology make it possible to generate more effective vac-
cines. Many of these are used to protect production spe-
cies such as pigs and/or prevent zoonosis, for example,
the vaccines used to control Swine Influenza [131].
Biosecurity assessment
When designing a biosecurity program, it may be useful to
have a system allowing an objective assessment of farm bio-
security. Such assessment can be used to prioritize which
biosecurity measures should be improved or implemented
first in order to reduce the likelihood of disease introduc-
tion and/or spread. In addition, it might enable to monitor
farm biosecurity over time and to compare it with that of
other farms (benchmarking). This may be especially im-
portant when applied to an entire production system of a
company. It allows planning of the production flow and to
determine what contacts and risk are admissible. Therefore,
biosecurity evaluations will allow to improve risk manage-
ment associated with the transmission of diseases both at
the farm and at the company or territory level [131]. In
addition, estimates about farm biosecurity might help to
calculate the benefits in production, health status or anti-
microbial consumption produced by the implementation of
a given measure, contributing therefore to a more precise
application and to increase motivation and awareness on
farmers and veterinarians [132–135].
Assessing biosecurity includes measuring the potential
routes for disease transmission. The first step is to col-
lect biosecurity practices applied on the farm. For this,
epidemiological surveys including questions that evalu-
ate the external and internal biosecurity measures ap-
plied to the different routes of pathogen introduction
and spread can be used. Epidemiological connections
must be investigated as well.
Several methods to assess farm biosecurity have been
developed. This is presented in the next sections.
Biosecurity assessments based on scores
The most common biosecurity assessment has been the
creation of scores. Most of these scores are based on
values attributed to the biosecurity practices by expert
opinion panels. Some of the scoring systems evaluate
measures that are common to the transmission of differ-
ent types of infectious agents while others are disease-
specific.
One first approach is produce a score for farm that re-
sults from summing up the scores for different biosecur-
ity practices and setting a threshold from action [7, 136].
Researchers from Ghent University developed the Bio-
check.UGent™ biosecurity scoring system [137]. In this
system, biosecurity practice values, as well as the differ-
ent pathways for disease transmission, are multiplied by
a weight factor accounting on their relative importance,
obtaining therefore a risk-based weighted score for the
farm biosecurity. Sasaki et al. [138] developed a similar
evaluation system named BioAsseT. Several scoring sys-
tems developed for specific pathogens (PRRS, Brachy-
spira hyodysenteriae, Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae) have
been reported [139–142].
On the other hand, some authors have applied statis-
tical methods to develop biosecurity scores based on the
rank of biosecurity practices according to their import-
ance. For example, Zang et al. [143] used a multi-criteria
Decision Analysis (MCDA), a method that assesses the
relative importance of biosecurity practices by pair-wise
comparison of measures in order to estimate how many
times more important is one measure in relation to
other [144]. Silva et al. [118] applied this method to
PRRS.
Silva et al. (2018) [118] used the item response theory
to create a general biosecurity score in pig farms. This
method is based on the notion that farms that imple-
ment some biosecurity practices will also implement
others related to it. By using this method, they were able
to reduce the number of variables needed to quantify
the biosecurity level of pig farms, simplifying thus the
method.
All of the above-mentioned systems (with the excep-
tion of the study of Silva et al. (2019) [145] have used
data obtained from experts. This often introduces some
bias as uses subjective estimates. Expert opinion might
be influenced by different factors, mostly previous expe-
riences, the epidemiological situation in a country, or
the prevailing idea in an area, among others. However,
when no sufficient data are available in the literature this
is a valid option as far as some basic principles are
followed [146]. An adequate selection of experts based
on their knowledge, experience and background but also
on the lack of conflicts of interest is paramount.
Biosecurity assessments providing probability estimates
Multivariate statistical models [147], Bayesian Belief Net-
works [148] and machine-learning algorithms [149] are
some of the statistical models used to quantify the prob-
ability of disease occurrence and to evaluate the impact
of the implementation of biosecurity practices. Although
they do not consider the biological plausibility of the in-
cluded variables they may be useful methods for the de-
velopment of tools for measuring, benchmarking and
managing biosecurity practices as described by Silva
et al. [149] for PRRSV.
Quantitative risk assessment, as described by OIE
[146], may also be useful to estimate the probability of
disease introduction and to prioritize biosecurity
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measures based on their impact on the probability of
disease transmission. The ultimate goal of risk analysis is
to provide evidences to support decisions taken for miti-
gating risk of disease spread. This type of models con-
siders the different pathways by which a pathogen can
be introduced and transmitted and, within each of them,
considers the different events that should have occurred
for the pathogen to be transmitted. Events may depend
on others and, each of them is assigned a probability
based on the best knowledge available at that time, con-
sidering uncertainty or variability. Next, the probability
is determined for each pathway and globally with indica-
tion of the confidence intervals [146]. Quantitative risk
assessment models have been mainly used to estimate
the probability of introduction of diseases at a country
level [150] and for a single disease but generic risk as-
sessment tools are also under development [151].
Quantitative risk assessment models also have several
limitations. On the one hand, they are complex and time
consuming and, on the other hand, they require of many
data that are not always available. Nevertheless, they
have the advantage of estimating the probability of dis-
ease introduction based on existing biosecurity practices
and therefore, support the decision making on which
biosecurity measures should be prioritized to reduce
such probability. Some attempts to use this kind of
models for biosecurity assessment at farm level have
been developed for other species [152] but for the mo-
ment, to the best of our knowledge, not for pig farms.
Design and implementation of biosecurity programs
A biosecurity program can be designed for a specific dis-
ease and focus on the measures towards that disease, or
it can be more generic and can be designed to reduce
the risks common to different diseases. In any case, as a
first step, it is advisable to establish a list of undesirable
diseases and identify the routes by which they are more
likely to enter the farm, so that prevention measures can
be placed where they will be most effective. Biosecurity
assessments described in the previous section could be
useful for this task.
Once the list is set, the forms of transmission have
been identified, the risks associated with each circum-
stance have been identified and, the measures to be ap-
plied have been selected, they must be implemented
effectively. At this stage, the program development
should be evaluated and followed-up leading to the
modification or expansion of the existing measures. To
carry out the implementation of the biosecurity pro-
gram, management protocols must be generated that de-
scribe step by step the actions to be applied, together
with the training of the farm staff and the professionals
involved.
One of the main problems for this long-term mainten-
ance of the program is that, if it is effective, the result
will be that the entry of new diseases will not be seen or
the spread of existing ones will be reduced. In other
words, if the program is successful, nothing will happen
and this will give a false feeling of lack of risk. This
might lead to the relaxation of the implementation of
biosecurity practices, which, in turn, could increase the
probability of disease introduction or transmission.
The application of biosecurity in each farm is a re-
sponsibility of the industry and, ultimately, of the owners
of the farms [153, 154]. However, sociological and even
psychological factors must be considered. It is critical to
know the attitude and the expectations regarding disease
prevention of people in charge of implementing the bio-
security program [155]. Possible motivators and barriers
must be considered as well.
In recent years, several studies explored the factors in-
fluencing decision-making by pig farmers, as well as
their attitude towards biosecurity [156–161]. Some of
the reported factors could be classified as “personal” in-
cluding knowledge about the transmission of diseases
and about biosecurity, gender (often women do a better
implementation of biosecurity programs), age and years
of experience, the personality, as well as the connection
of people to sources of information (technical advice,
producer network, etc.) [160–164].
Regarding the availability and credibility of information
sources, different studies showed that veterinarians are the
source of information in which farmers place greater con-
fidence when animal health and biosecurity are to dealt
with [162–164] but not the only one. Farmers do also con-
sider the recommendations of other sources such as those
coming from the food industry or producer groups,
among others [162]. Nevertheless, increasing awareness
on biosecurity and disease prevention on veterinarians
have been suggested as of paramount importance to im-
prove farm biosecurity [165].
Another factor of great impact in the application of
biosecurity measures is the risk perception of a disease
and its consequences on the farm. Greater application of
biosecurity measures has been observed after outbreaks
of diseases such as PRRS [157] or influenza [148] as well
as in densely populated areas of pigs, probably due to a
higher perception of the transmission risk between
neighbours [160]. Producer education is also an import-
ant factor, as described by Gillespie et al. [165]. In that
study, the perspectives of Swedish farmers on the inci-
dence, control and communication related to infectious
livestock diseases were investigated. Results indicated
that farmers who believe that they have the necessary
knowledge, have a greater sense of control and also
demanded that others took responsibility for preventing
the spread of disease.
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Therefore, to improve the application of biosecurity
measures, farmer and veterinarian’s awareness should be
increased, probably using participatory methods. In this
sense, various governments and institutions have devel-
oped guides, manuals and materials to persuade pro-
ducers and veterinarians on why and how to apply
biosecurity measures. Unfortunately, many of these man-
uals have little real impact as producers think that those
recommendations are irrelevant or impractical, even for
those who have had disease outbreaks or may receive fi-
nancial support. Part of this failure is due to the low
confidence on government institutions. Likewise, part of
the producers believes that the responsibility for the ap-
plication of the measures lies with the health organiza-
tions, particularly when the measures are intended to
zoonosis control or are applied by international legal or
market pressures [156, 166].
Conclusion
Biosecurity has become an essential element of livestock
production, particularly in intensive systems such as in
the pig industry. The avoidance of the introduction of
new pathogens and the limitation of their spread will
contribute to increase the wellbeing of pigs, the product-
ivity of the farms and will contribute to public health as
well. A better knowledge of the epidemiology of the pig
diseases will contribute to the design of better biosecur-
ity programs. Moreover, the development of quantitative
assessment methods will permit a more precise selection
of measures and a fine evaluation of their impact. Col-
laboration with other branches of science such as soci-
ology or psychology may help to the sustainable
implementation of biosecurity plans.
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